A set of sub-cortical nuclei called basal ganglia is critical for learning the values of actions. The basal ganglia include two pathways, which have been associated with approach and avoid behavior respectively, and are differentially modulated by dopamine projections from the midbrain. According to the influential opponent actor learning model, these pathways represent learned estimates of the positive and negative consequences (payoffs and costs) of actions. The level of dopamine release controls to what extent payoffs and costs enter the overall evaluation of actions. How the knowledge about payoff and cost is acquired is still an open question, even though many theories describe learning from feedback in the basal ganglia. We examine whether a set of plasticity rules proposed to model reinforcement learning in the pathways of the basal ganglia is suitable to extract payoffs and costs from a reward prediction error signal.
Diagrams of changes in the weights G and N associated with lever pressing at each stage of the experience presented in panel (a) . In all diagrams, the black circles represent the cortical neurons selective for the state (being in the operant box), and the green and red circles represent the Go and No-Go populations of striatal neurons, respectively, selective for the action (pressing lever). The thickness of the arrows linking the circles represents the connection strength between the respective neuron populations. The blue shading in the background indicates the strength of the immediate reinforcement, with color intensity proportional to the magnitude of reward.
To mathematically implement these ideas, we need to model the weighs of the Go 98 pathway G, the weighs of the No-Go pathway N , and the prediction error. The reward 99 prediction error, which we denote by δ, quantifies the difference between the expected 100 reward and the received reward r. If r is negative, we shall speak of cost, and when r is 101 PLOS 6/41 positive, we shall speak of payoff. Payoff creates positive reinforcement, and thus attraction, whilst cost creates negative reinforcement, and thus avoidance. The expected 103 reward, on the other hand, directly corresponds to the expected payoffs and costs, 104 which -according to our theory -are represented by the synaptic weights G and N . We 105 take the expected reward to be the average over the expected payoff and the expected 106 cost. All together, we model the reward prediction error as
Equipped with the quantities δ, G and N , we can formulate our theory of learning 108 payoff and cost. To do so, we simply describe how the collective connection strengths G 109
and N change when a prediction error δ is received; we use ∆G and ∆N to denote the 110 changes in connection strengths. Note that any update only applies if the resulting 111 weights are still positive -if an update would render any one weight negative, that 112 weight is set to zero instead. In all other cases, we follow Mikhael and Bogacz [16] in 113 prescribing 114 ∆G = αf (δ) − λG (2)
where α is the learning rate, is the slope parameter and λ the decay rate. The G and N change according to these rules, they will eventually represent payoff and cost. 118
There is an intuition for each term in the rules 2 and 3. These intuitions are most 119 easily gained by constructing the rules from scratch; therefore we will now retrace the 120 three steps of that construction. Several models of learning in Go and No-Go neurons 121 assume that the effect of the prediction error on G is opposite to its effect on N [7, 8] . 122 We thus start by proposing that ∆G and ∆N might simply be proportional to the 123 prediction error and its negative, respectively. To see whether this proposal works, we 124
formulate it mathematically and simulate the learning of an alternating sequence of There is a problem: the strengthening of N due to negative prediction error, 127 caused by the cost, is always immediately reversed by the following positive prediction 128 error caused by the payoff. The same is true for the changes in G. As illustrated by the 129 simulation, there is no net effect of learning.
130
To overcome this problem, we proceed by damping the impact of negative prediction 131 errors (which are usually caused by costs) on G, and the impact of positive parameters is key to unlock that potential, and we shall now investigate how that choice 150 must be made. In particular, we will derive certain relations between parameters that 151 must be satisfied for payoff and cost to be learned.
152
Originally, the rules 2 and 3 were meant to describe learning of reward statistics.
153
Mikhael and Bogacz [16] showed that after learning, particular combinations of G and 154 N will encode the mean ER and the mean spread E |R − ER| of the received rewards.
155
For further reference, we denote these important statistics by q := ER and 156 s := E |R − q|. How are the mean and the mean spread of received rewards related to 157 payoff and cost? Consider the reward statistics of an action that reliably requires effort 158 to produce a payoff. Repeat that action multiple times, and record all received rewards, 159 the costs as well as the payoffs. Finally, analyze how all these received rewards are 160 distributed. If effort was required to earn the payoff, the distribution of rewards will 161 turn out bimodal, as schematically shown in around the mean payoff p, and one centered around the mean cost −n, respectively. Fig 163   4 also shows the mean q and the mean spread s of that distribution. We observe that 164 payoffs and costs are both exactly one mean spread s away from the center q of the 165 distribution -the payoff above, and the cost below. This implies that there is, at least 166 in this representative case, a strong connection between payoffs and costs and the
This connection allows us to set up conditions for the result of learning: if G and N 169 are to represent payoff and cost, they must approach q + s and −q + s respectively.
170
Equivalently, we can ask for 1/2 (G − N ) and 1/2 (G + N ) to approach q and s in the The relation of reward statistics to payoff and cost. The graph shows a representative reward distribution over the magnitude r of all received rewards. The parts of the distribution that indicate negative rewards (costs) are colored red, while the parts that indicate positive rewards (payoffs) are colored green. The mean q and the mean spread s are indicated above the distribution, the mean cost −n and the mean payoff p are indicated below the distribution.
After revealing the link between reward statistics and payoff and cost, we are ready 173 to derive the relations necessary to learn the latter. To that end, we first determine the 174 connection strengths G and N that result from training on stochastic rewards. Such 175 uncertain rewards are sampled at random from a fixed distribution. Then, we 176 implement the newly identified conditions, demanding for 1/2 (G − N ) to approximate 177 q and 1/2 (G + N ) to approximate s after training is finished. From these conditions, 178 we will be able to derive the desired parameter relations.
179
Working through these steps is simpler after changing variables from G and N to respectively. 1 Exploiting these properties, we obtain
Here, for brevity of notation, we introduced the effective learning rates these identities and the learning rules 6 and 7, we can determine the equilibrium points 203 Q * and S * :
To solve these equations, we shall make the additional assumption that the 
with c Q = a Q / (α Q + λ) and 1/c S = α S /λ. Those are the approximate values of Q 210 and S after learning.
211
Next, we need to implement the conditions we inferred from at least approximately -satisfy the conditions? We discuss each of these questions in 226 the following paragraphs.
227
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Firstly, is it possible to satisfy c Q = 1 and c S = 1 exactly? Examining the definition 228
quickly reveals that letting c Q → 1 would amount to letting λ → 0 229 2 . Now, we derived above that after learning, S will fluctuate about its equilibrium
In order to keep the equilibrium point S * 231 finite as λ → 0, we would therefore be forced to have α S → 0 also. This, though, would 232 pose a real problem: α S is the effective learning rate for S -having it vanish would 233 imply stopping learning in S all together. We must conclude that strict satisfaction of 234 the constraints c Q = 1 and c S = 1 is not compatible with non-vanishing learning rates 235 that lead to a finite equilibrium. Specifically, c Q = 1 can only ever hold approximately 236
if the spread s is to be learned in finite time. Nevertheless, no such problem arises when 237 c S is set to 1 exactly.
238
Now, what do the constraints c Q ≈ 1 and c S = 1 mean in terms of the parameters α, 239 λ and ? In the previous paragraph, we saw that c Q ≈ 1 is equivalent to λ/α Q ≈ 0. 
The other condition, c S = 1, is easily translated analogously. We need only use the 244
Equations 14 and 15 constitute the exact relations between the parameters α, γ and 246 that need to hold for payoffs and costs to be estimated accurately. They cannot be 247 further simplified, but we may use them to gain some more insight into the required 248 magnitudes of the individual parameters: by substituting 2λ according to Eq 15 on the 249 right hand side of Eq 14, one quickly reaches the conclusion that ≈ 1. Reinserting this 250
into Eq 14 yields λ α. In conclusion, we found that it is necessary (though not 251 sufficient) for accurate learning of payoffs and costs to maintain a small, but non 252 2 Technically, it amounts to λ/α Q → 0. However, α Q is an effective learning rate, and so must take values smaller then one. Thus, we really need to let λ → 0 vanishing nonlinearity in the transmission of the prediction error signal, as well as a 253 non vanishing decay rate λ, which is much smaller than the learning rate α. To answer that question, we must again determine the connection strengths that 276 result from experiencing the action time and again. Now, we do not have to rely on a 277 probabilistic treatment -when the pattern of the rewards is fully known, it is possible to 278 determine the evolution of G and N exactly. As in the previous section, we will 279 concentrate on the result of learning rather than on its dynamics. Here, this amounts to 280 determine the fixed points of the learning rules. These fixed points are simply those 281 values of G and N (or equivalently of the alternative variables Q and S we defined 282 PLOS 14/41 above) that are invariant under the updates caused by the action. We denote the fixed 283 points by G * and N * , or Q * and S * . During learning, the variables converge to their 284 respective fixed points, and cease to change notably once they arrive in their vicinity.
285
First, we focus on determining the fixed point of Q. Note that each encounter with 286 the action yields two updates of Q: one due to the cost and one due to the payoff.
287
Mathematically, we can formulate this as
To find Q * , demand that these successive updates have no net effect on Q: If 289 Q after action equals Q before action , then Q before action can rightfully be called fixed point.
290
If this is so, the two updates must have canceled each other:
This condition, in combination with the update rules 2 and 3, allows to determine 292 Q * in terms of p, n and the parameters α, and λ. 
where α Q = α (1 + ) /2. Now, recall that the definition of Q in terms of G and N is 297
, and that true payoffs and costs of in this model are p and n. If G 298 and N represented the true payoffs and costs after learning, it must be true that G * ≈ p 299 and N * ≈ n, and thereby 
Again, using the definition S = 1/2(G + N ) allows to compare the result of learning 313
with the the strengths required to represent payoffs and costs. We immediately find 314 that G * ≈ p and N * ≈ n already hold. Thus, 19 is the only additional condition for 315 successful learning of payoff and cost from rewards that follow a strong pattern.
316
From the results presented in this section, we conclude that the learning rules 2 and 317 3 facilitate learning of the magnitudes of fixed payoffs and costs that occur reliably one 318 after the other. However, we also saw that this is only true if 19 holds in addition to the 319 conditions that we derived in the previous section. 
hold. These conditions imply, but do not follow from, a non-vanishing but small 332 nonlinearity in the transmission of the prediction error, and a non-vanishing but 333 small 3 decay of the connection weights.
334
If trained on a pattern of rewards that alternates between payoffs of magnitude p 335 and costs of magnitude n, the plasticity rules 2 and 3 will capture the those exact 336 payoffs and costs if, in addition to 21 and 22,
holds. In words, unbiased learning of payoffs and costs in deterministic scenarios 338 explicitly requires a small learning rate α.
339
Simulations of learning 340
The previous sections revealed what to expect from training the learning rules 2 and 3 341 on certain types of reward. Specifically, we investigated the connection strengths G and 342 N after many experiences of either totally predictable or totally random rewards. In 343 this section, we aim to confirm and extend those results using numerical simulations 344 rather then analytic methods. pressing a lever in order to obtain a nutricious pellet, and freely available lab chow [23] . 381
Normal animals were willing to work for pellets, but after dopamine depletion they were 382 not any more willing to make an effort and preferred a less valuable but free option. 383 Collins and Frank [8] provided a mechanical explanation for this surprising effect. The 384 theory proposed in this paper accounts for it in a conceptually similar but slightly 385 simpler way. Here, we explain our modeling of the experiment, and then describe the 
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In our model of the experiment, we run through a sequence of trials mimicking those 456 illustrated in Fig 6: on each trial, the model makes a choice between two actions -457 pressing a lever or approaching lab chow -or remains inactive. Before the main 458 experiments, the animals were trained to press lever to obtain reward and were exposed 459 to the lab chow [23] . To parallel this in simulations, the model was first trained such 460 that it experienced each action a number of times, received corresponding payoffs and 461 costs, and updated its weights according to equations 2 and 3. The weights resulting 462 from that learning are reported in Fig 6b and Fig 6c. Then, the model was tested with 463 baseline and reduced dopaminergic motivation signal. As described in Materials and So far, we assumed that the reward prediction is computed by the same striatal neurons 471 that encode the payoffs and costs of actions. Only one network was involved: that 472 which is responsible for the choice of action. We refer to such a network as 'actor' in the 473 remainder of this exposition. In this section, we look at how the theory described above 474
generalizes to the actor-critic framework [26] . That framework assumes that the reward 475 prediction is not computed by the actor, but by a separate group of striatal patch 476 neurons called the 'critic'. More formally, the purpose of that critic is to learn the value 477 V of the current state.
478
One way to generalize our theory in this direction is to keep the actor network 479 unaltered, while substituting it with a similar critic network that learns by the very 480 same rules 2 and 3:
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The crucial difference between the actor and the critic is that the critic network is 482 not selective for the action, but only for the state. It thus learns the value of a state 483 irrespective of the actions chosen. Importantly, the critic is in charge of suppling the 484 reward predictions. Those predictions are compared to the actual outcomes to produce 485 the reward prediction errors δ from which both networks learn. 486 We take the state value to be encoded in the difference of G critic and N critic : 
The prediction error δ -which teaches the actor as well -is the difference between 490 the obtained reward r and the reward prediction by the critic:
What would be learned with that architecture? If the same action is selected on each 492 trial, the actor will learn in exactly the same way as the critic. Then, the prediction 493 error in the actor-critic model is the same as in the actor-only model described above, 494 and the weights of the actor in the actor-critic model converge to exactly the same 495 values as for the actor-only model. However, this reasoning does not seem to apply if 496 more than one action is available: empirically, animals then select the actions that 497 maximize their rewards in their own perception. In the process of learning, they will 498 likely sample all available actions.
499
If such behavior generates input for an actor-critic model, the critic will integrate 500 the experience of all those trials, and will thus represent a mixture of the expected 501 rewards associated with the available actions. This generally interferes with correct 502 learning of the payoffs and costs of the different actions. However, there is a caveat: one 503 of the available actions will eventually proof most useful; as soon as the animal has 504 determined that best action, it will select it in the majority of cases. That, in turn, 505 forces the critic into mainly representing the expected reward of this best action. As a 506
final consequence, also payoff and cost of that best action are inferred correctly.
507
We confirmed the conclusions of this discussion empirically for the model specified 508 PLOS 25/41 above: in Fig 8, we present simulations of a task in which the subject must choose 509 between two actions. Both actions reliably yield a constant cost followed by a constant 510 payoff each time they are selected. One of the actions is unambiguously superior to the 511 other: its payoff is larger and the its cost is lower. where Q a = 1/2 (G a − N a ) was the action value, and β was the softmax temperature. Relationship to experimental data 535 The model described in this paper was shown in simulations to avoid action requiring 536 effort when the motivational signal was reduced. The unwillingness to make an effort 537 for reward in dopamine depleted state has also been observed in other paradigms:
538
During a choice in a T-maze, dopamine depleted animals were less likely to go to an 539 arm with more pellets behind the barrier, but rather chose the arm with easily 540 accessible but fewer pellets [27] . Parkinson's patients were not willing to exert as much 541 physical effort by squeezing a handle in order to obtain reward as healthy controls, 542 especially if they were off medications [28] . These effects can be explained in an 543 analogous way [8] by assuming that in the dopamine depleted state the effort of crossing 544 the barrier or squeezing a handle is weighted more, resulting in lower activity of The four displays re-plot the data from Figures 3E, 3B , 3F and 1H in the paper by [11] . (d) Changes in dopamine receptor occupancy. The green and red curves show the probabilities of D1 and D2 receptor occupancies in a biophysical model of [29] . The two dashed blue lines in each panel indicate the levels of dopamine in dorsal (60 nM) and ventral (85 nM) striatum estimated on the basis of spontaneous firing of dopaminergic neurons using the biophysical model [30] . Displays with white and blue backgrounds illustrate changes in receptor occupancy when the level of dopamine is reduced or increased respectively.
The proposed model assumes that while an animal makes an effort, the reward 587 prediction error should be negative, thus the dopamine level should decrease. However, 588
at the time of lever pressing the system needs to be energized to perform a movement, 589 so one could expect increased level of dopamine. Furthermore, voltametry studies 590 measuring dopamine concentration in striatum did not observe decrease in dopamine 591 level during lever pressing [32] . Nevertheless a recent study recording activity of single 592 dopaminergic neurons that provided a better temporal resolution reported that 593 dopaminergic neurons increased the activity before movement, and then decreased it 594 below baseline during movement [30] . The increase before movement may be related 595 with energizing system for movement, while the decrease during movement may be 596 related with representing effort.
597
Another study [34] directly tested whether dopaminergic signals encode expected trials. One could compare if they follow the pattern predicted by the rules given in this 630 paper, or rather by other rules proposed to describe learning in striatal neurons [7, 8, 14] . 631
Similarly as the OpAL model [8] , the theory proposes that the positive and negative 632 consequences are separately encoded by the Go and No-Go neurons which are 633 differentially modulated by dopamine. The theory predicts that agonists specific to just 634 one of the striatal populations (e.g. a D2 agonist), should decrease the effect of 635 consequences encoded by this population (e.g. negative) without changing the impact of 636 the other population. This prediction could be tested in an experiment involving choice 637 between options with both payoff and cost. In particular, the theory predicts that the 638 degree of preference of a neutral option (p = 1, n = 1) over a high cost option 639 (p = 1, n = 2) should increase with D2-agonist, while the preference of a high payoff 640 option (p = 2, n = 1) over a neutral option (p = 1, n = 1) should not be affected by the 641 D2-agonist.
manipulations, but also by changing a behavioral context such as hunger, or reward rate 645 which has been shown to affect the average dopamine level [19] . If such an experiment 646 was done in humans (or non-human primates), an eye-tracker could be used to 647 investigate whether participants spend more time on a part of the stimulus informing 648 about payoff in blocks with high hunger or reward rate.
649
The theory assumes that the synaptic plasticity rules include a decay term 650 proportional to the value of the synaptic weights themselves. Decay terms are also 651 present in other models of learning in basal ganglia [15, 35, 37] . This class of models 652 predicts that the synaptic weights of striatal neurons which are already high increase 653 less during potentiation than the smaller weights (an opposite prediction is made by the 654
OpAL model [8] , where the weights scale the prediction error in the update rule converge to zero when an action that results first in a cost and then in the payoff is 672 repeatedly selected.
673
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The OpAL model is based on the actor critic framework; hence, the prediction error 674 is defined as in Eq (28) . The weights of the critic are modified simply as ∆V = αδ. The 675
weights of the actor are modified according to the following equations [8] : 
G after payoff = G after cost + αG after cost d
Substituting Eq (31) into Eq (32) we obtain:
686
G after payoff = G before action − αG before action d + α(G before action − αG before action d)d
= G before action − α 2 G before action d 2
We see that within a trial a Go weight decays proportionally to is value, resulting in 687 an exponential decay across trials seen in costs. It is worth noting that the decay of actor weights to zero demonstrated above is 691 specific to the version of basal ganglia model proposed by Collins and Frank [8] , but 692 would not be present in another version of the model [35] where the learning rules 693 include a special term preventing the weights from approaching zero.
694
The model described in this paper has been shown to account for the effects of 695 dopamine depletion on willingness to make effort, which have also been simulated with 696 the OpAL model. To simulate the effects of dopamine depletion on choice between an 697 arm of a T-maze with more pellets behind a barrier and an arm with with fewer 698 pellets, [8] trained a model on three separate actions: eating in the left arm, eating in 699 the right arm, and crossing a barrier. In this way it was ensured that each action had 700 just payoff or just cost, and the model could learn them. Subsequently, during choice the 701 model was deciding between a combination of two actions (e.g. crossing a barrier and 702 eating in the left arm) and the other action. By contrast, the model proposed in this 703 paper was choosing just between the two options available to an animal in an analogous 704 task (Fig 6) , because it was able to learn both payoffs and costs associated with each
option. This is a useful ability, as most real world actions have both payoffs and costs. 706
In the original paper introducing the plasticity rules [16] , it was proposed that the 707 rules allow the Go and No-Go neurons to encode reward variability, because when an 708 action results in variable rewards, both G and N increase during learning. It was 709 further proposed that the tonic level of dopamine controls the tendency to make risky 710 choices, as observed in experiments [36] , because it leads to emphasizing potential gains, 711
and under-weighting potential losses. However, here it is proposed that the striatal 712 learning rules primarily sub-serve a function more fundamental for survival, i.e. learning 713 payoffs and costs of actions. From this perspective, the influence of dopamine level on 714 tendency to make risky choices arises as a by-product of a system primarily optimized 715 to weight payoffs and costs according to the current motivational state.
716
Directions for the future work 717 There are multiple directions in which the presented theory could be extended. For 718 example, the theory has to be integrated with the models of action selection in the basal 719 ganglia to describe how the circuit selects the action with the best trade-off of payoffs 720 and costs. Furthermore, the theory may be extended to describe the dependence of the 721 dopaminergic teaching signal on the motivational state [38] .
722
It is intriguing to ask whether the evaluation of actions combining separately 723 encoded positive and negative consequences is also performed by areas beyond the basal 724 ganglia. Indeed, positive and negative associations are encoded by different populations 725 of neurons in the amygdala [39] . Moreover, an imaging study [40] suggests that costs 726 and payoffs are predicted by the amygdala and the ventral striatum respectively, and 727 ultimately compared in the prefrontal cortex. Furthermore, different cortical regions 728 preferentially project to Go or No-Go neurons [41] , raising the possibility that the 729 positive and negative consequences are also encoded separately in the cortex. Therefore, 730
it seems promising to investigate if similar plasticity rules could also describe learning 731 beyond the basal ganglia.
During simulations of an experiment by Salamone et al. [23] , the model received payoff 734 p pellet = 10 for choosing a pellet, and payoff p chow for approaching the lab chow. The 735 model was simulated in two conditions differing in the cost of choosing a pellet which 736 was equal to n pellet = 0 in the free-pellet condition, and to n pellet = n lever in a condition 737 requiring lever pressing to obtain a pellet. There was no cost of choosing lab chow 
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In the above equation Z dataset k is a normalization term equal to the total number of 762 choices or consumption in a particular condition:
The values of parameters minimizing the cost function were sought using the 764 Simplex optimization algorithm implemented in Matlab, and the following values were 765 found: p chow = 3.64, n lever = 4.57, D anta = 0.30 and σ = 1.10. Subsequently, the model 766 with these optimized parameters was simulated with N rats = 6, which was the number 767 of animals tested by [23] . The resulting mean number of choices across animals are 
